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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Melinda Denise Gray appeals from the Order of Probation and Withheld 
Judgment entered upon the jury verdicts finding her guilty of driving under the 
influence, possession of paraphernalia, and felony possession of a controlled 
substance. Gray claims that her conviction was the result of misconduct based 
on some of the prosecutor's examination of a police officer. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Officer Travis Poore was on patrol when he noticed a female on a 
motorcycle leaving the Kings Lounge parking lot "swaying on it, really unsteady." 
(Trial Tr., p.119, L.20 - p.120, L.6.) Officer Poore followed the motorcycle and 
saw the rider make "quick right-hand turn" without "using a turn signal or any 
hand motions as required." (Trial Tr., p.120, Ls.12-15.) The rider made a 
second turn and, "[o]nce again," did not use a signal "to indicate that turn." (Trial 
Tr., p.120, Ls.18-19.) The rider also "turned into the far left lane," but was 
"supposed to turn in the first lane available." (Trial Tr., p.120, Ls.20-24.) As 
Officer Poore continued to follow the motorcycle, he observed the rider exceed 
the speed limit by going "53 miles per hour in [a] 35 mile an hour zone." (Trial 
Tr., p.121, Ls.8-9.) Based on the driving pattern and traffic violations, Officer 
Poore conducted a stop on the motorcycle. (Trial Tr., p.19-22.) "The motorcycle 
didn't yield at the start" but "finally stopped." (Trial Tr., p.121, L.22 - p.122, L.2.) 
When it did stop, "the driver fell over, and the motorcycle went on. Looked really 
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unsteady. And then the driver came, hit the ground, and [her] helmet came off." 
(Trial Tr., p.122, Ls.5-9.) 
Upon making contact with the rider, Officer Poore asked if she was okay 
and, after confirming she was, he asked her for her license, registration, and 
insurance. (Trial Tr., p.122, Ls.9-24.) The rider, identified as Gray, produced 
her license but "[h]ad to be reminded several different times to get the 
registration" as she was "slow and lethargic." (Trial Tr., p.122, L.25-p.123, L.3.) 
Officer Poore also noticed Gray had "a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage 
coming from her breath, her speech was slurred, and [she had] very glassy 
bloodshot eyes." (Trial Tr., p.123, Ls.19-22.) Gray admitted drinking three 
beers, but denied she was taking any prescription medications. (Trial Tr., p.125, 
Ls.1-2, p.126, Ls.3-7.) Officer Poore then had Gray perform field sobriety tests, 
which she failed. (See generally Trial Tr., pp.127-136.) At one point during the 
process, Officer Poore "noticed that [Gray] had urinated herself." (Trial Tr., 
p.136, Ls.14-16.) Officer Poore arrested Gray for driving under the influence. 
(Trial Tr., p.136, Ls.17-18.) During a subsequent search incident to arrest, 
Officer Poore discovered a baggy in Gray's wallet that "had pills and a white 
powdery substance with some chunks in it." (Trial Tr., p.136, L.19 - p.137, 
L.14.) Gray claimed she had a prescription for the pills, but denied knowledge of 
the powdery substance, although she later indicated she crushes her pills and 
snorts them since she had gastric bypass surgery. (Trial Tr., p.141, L.23 -
p.142, L.13.) 
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Officer Poore had Gray perform a blood alcohol test. (See generally Trial 
Tr., pp.142-145.) The results of the test were .143, .140. (Trial Tr., p.145, L.25 -
p.146, L.2.) 
Corporal Chadrick Shepard, who assisted Officer Poore, searched Gray's 
motorcycle after his canine alerted on it. (Trial Tr., p.169, Ls.21-25, p.183, Ls.4-
16.) During that search, Corporal Shepard located a sunglass case in which he 
found a "glass methamphetamine pipe." (Trial Tr., p.183, L.17 - p.184, L.3; 
Exhibit 3.) Corporal Shepard also field tested the powdery substance Officer 
Poore found; the substance tested positive for methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., 
p.176, L.23 - p.178, L.19.) Subsequent testing by the Idaho State Police 
Forensic Lab confirmed the field test results. (Trial Tr., p.205, Ls.12-24.) 
The state charged Gray with driving under the influence, possession of drug 
paraphernalia, one count of felony possession of a controlled substance, and 
two counts of misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.8-9, 
36-37, 47-48; see pp.49-50.) The state dismissed the misdemeanor possession 
of a controlled substance charges and Gray proceeded to trial on the three 
remaining charges; the jury convicted Gray on all three counts. (R., p.67; see R., 
pp.108-109 (verdict form).) The court entered an Order of Probation and 




Gray states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the State engage in one or more instances of 
misconduct, such that Ms. Gray is entitled to a new trial? 
2. Was there such an accumulation of errors in this case that 
Ms. Gray was denied a fair trial? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Gray failed to establish the prosecutor committed misconduct during 
her questioning of Corporal Shepard? 
2. Does Gray's cumulative error claim fail because she has failed to show 




Gray Has Failed To Show The Prosecutor's Examination Of Corporal Shepard 
Constitutes Misconduct Entitling Her To A New Trial 
A. Introduction 
Gray claims her "conviction was the product of acts of misconduct," citing 
three areas of questioning she believes were improper. (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) 
First, Gray complains that the prosecutor "attempt[ed] to establish one of the law 
enforcement witnesses as an 'expert' in determining when a person is telling the 
truth." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) Second, Gray claims it was misconduct to "offer[] 
opinion testimony concerning [her] purported untruthfulness and her 
guilt/innocence." (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) Finally, Gray argues the prosecutor 
committed misconduct by "eliciting testimony from a law enforcement witness 
regarding his conclusion as to one of the elements of a charge-evidence that 
had previously been ruled inadmissible and which usurped the jury's role." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) All of Gray's arguments fail. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"[T]he standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct 
depends on whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial." State v. 
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715, 215 P.3d 414,435 (2009). If a defendant fails to 
timely object at trial to alleged misconduct by the prosecutor, the conviction will 
be set aside for prosecutorial misconduct only upon a showing by the defendant 
that the alleged misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error. ~ at 228, 
245 P.3d at 980. 
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C. Gray Has Failed To Advance Any Legitimate Claim Of Misconduct 
During direct examination, the prosecutor asked Corporal Shepard: 
"From everything that you found, did you form an opinion as to whether or not 
the defendant possessed this methamphetamine." (Trial Tr., p.188, Ls.1-18.) 
Defense counsel objected and the objection was sustained. (Trial Tr., p.188, 
Ls.19, 22.) Gray argues that "it appears that Corporal Shepard's testimony was 
proffered as some sort of expert opinion under Rule 702" and, "[i]n such case, it 
was not properly admitted." (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Contrary to Gray's 
argument, the evidence was not admitted because the court sustained counsel's 
objection. Further, although the court sustained Gray's objection, the question 
regarding the officer's opinion as to whether or not Gray possessed 
methamphetamine was not clearly improper because it formed the basis for 
charging Gray with that offense - a fact the jury was clearly aware of given the 
charges submitted to it for deliberation. For this same reason, even if the 
prosecutor was prohibited from asking Corporal Shepard about his opinion on 
the possession charge, any error was harmless given the presence of the 
methamphetamine in Gray's belongings. 
Next, Gray complains about the following exchange between the 
prosecutor and Corporal Shepard: 
Q [by prosecutor]. From your training and experience, have 
you ever been lied to before? 
A.. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. What motivation would someone have to lie to you? 
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A. Simply that they don't want to be caught with the crime 
that they had committed. When people get into a spot where they 
don't want to take ownership or responsibility for their actions, then 
the easiest thing to do is to either not claim ownership or give us a 
false explanation of why it would have been in their possession. 
Q. And in the case of the things the defendant claimed 
ownership of, were any of them illegal to have? 
A. The methamphetamine and the glass methamphetamine 
pipe, yes, ma'am. 
Q. But she didn't claim ownership of them; correct? 
A. Oh, no, no, no. The things she claimed ownership of, I'm 
sorry, those were legal. It was the items that were illegal she didn't 
want to claim ownership of. 
Q. Is that something you would consider typical? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
(Trial Tr., p.188, L.23 - p.189, L.23.) With regard to this exchange, Gray repeats 
her complaint that the evidence was " not properly admitted" as expert testimony 
under I.RE. 702. (Appellant's Brief, p.9.) Because Gray did not object to this 
testimony at trial, she has the burden of showing fundamental error. 1 
Under the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010), unobjected to claims of constitutional error are 
reviewed for fundamental error using a three-part test: 
1 Gray contends that her objection to the question regarding whether Corporal 
Shepard thought Gray possessed methamphetamine "could be considered" to 
apply to Corporal Shepard's subsequent testimony regarding his opinion about 
why individuals might be motivated to lie. (Appellant's Brief, pp.10-11.) Gray 
cites no authority for the proposition that an objection to one line of questioning 
can be applied to subsequent questions, especially questions on a different 
topic. (See Appellant's Brief, p.10.) Gray's argument that an objection to one 
question continues in perpetuity as "part and parcel of the objection that was 
made" before it is without merit. (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) 
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(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the 
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the 
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including 
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical 
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error 
affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings. 
150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 (footnote omitted). Application of this test to 
the facts of this case shows Gray has failed to carry her burden of demonstrating 
fundamental error in the prosecutor's questioning of Corporal Shephard 
regarding a defendant's motive to lie. A "question calling for the opinion of one 
witness as to the truthfulness of another is clearly an invasion of the province of 
the jury, who are the judges of the credibility of witnesses." State v. 
Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463, 468, 163 P.3d 1175, 1180 (2007). The prosecutor 
did not, however, ask Officer Shepard for his opinion on whether Gray was lying 
about possessing contraband. Rather, the prosecutor asked Officer Shepard 
what motivation someone might have to lie and asked him whether Gray 
"claim[ed] ownership" of the contraband he found. (Trial Tr., p.189, Ls.1-17.) 
Officer Shepard testified that Gray did not claim ownership of the illegal items 
and that he considered her failure to do so "typical." (Trial Tr., p.189, Ls.17-22.) 
This testimony was not the equivalent of offering his opinion on whether Gray 
was lying; it was simply evidence demonstrating exactly what happened - that 
Gray admitted ownership of the legal items found in her possession, but not the 
illegal ones, even though the items were found with and in her property. Gray 
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cannot, therefore, demonstrate any constitutional violation under prong one of 
the fundamental error test. 
Even if this Court finds that the jury could improperly infer from the 
prosecutor's questions on this point and Officer Shepard's answers that Officer 
Shepard was of the opinion that Gray was lying, Gray has failed to show the 
error was clear or obvious or that counsel's decision not to object was anything 
but tactical. Ultimately, Officer Shepard's testimony that Gray admitted 
possessing the legal items was consistent with Gray's defense, which was that, 
although some of the items in her wallet and motorcycle belonged to her, the 
illegal items did not because others had access to both her wallet and her 
motorcycle over a short period when she left it unattended at the Kings Lounge. 
(See generally Trial Tr., pp.231-241.) 
Even if Gray could satisfy the first two prongs of Perry, she has failed to 
meet her burden of showing the error affected her substantial rights. Regardless 
of what Officer Shepard thought of Gray's denials regarding the drugs and 
paraphernalia, Gray's story was not credible. 2 It is unlikely a methamphetamine 
user would stash his or her supply and paraphernalia in someone else's wallet 
and motorcycle. The jury also undoubtedly did not believe Gray's claim that she 
2 Presumably Gray would concede that her complaints with respect to the 
testimony related to the methamphetamine and paraphernalia found in her 
possession has no bearing on the evidence that she was driving under the 
influence, which included not only her behavior but her blood alcohol test results. 
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left her wallet unsecured on her motorcycle with her prescription medications 
inside. (Trial Tr., p.235, L.24 - p.236, L.1.) Additionally, Gray's admission that 
she recognized the Ziploc bag containing the methamphetamine, explaining that 
she "used to put [her pills] in them," but had no idea how methamphetamine got 
in there defies logic. (Trial Tr., p.240, Ls.14-23.) For these reasons, any error in 
the unobjected-to admission of Officer Shepard's testimony regarding a 
defendant's motive to lie and Gray's admissions in this case was harmless. 
Finally, Gray contends the prosecutor "improperly, over the objection of 
defense counsel and the district court's ruling sustaining the objection, 
intentionally elicited testimony that the pipe found in [her] sunglasses case was 
possessed by her with the intent to smoke methamphetamine." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.13.) According to Gray, the "prosecutor essentially re-asked the same 
question that had just been ruled inadmissible by the district court." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.13.) The particular exchange Gray cites reads as follows: 
Q. And when you find something like this pipe and a substance, do 
you come to -- do you form any opinions? 
A. I do. 
Q. What are those opinions? 
A. The person in possession of it is typically a drug user. 
Obviously in this case the methamphetamine --
[Defense counsel]: Objection, Your Honor. She's asking him to 
come to a conclusion that's in the province of the jury. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q [by prosecutor]: If you find a pipe and a substance and it is a 
pipe that you recognize to be one used for ingesting that substance 
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into the body, would you come to a conclusion that that pipe was 
used for that substance? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
(Trial Tr., p.198, Ls.1-18 (cited in Appellant's Brief at pp.13-15).) 
Gray's assertion that the prosecutor "essentially re-asked the same 
question" after the objection and "flout[ed] the district court's ruling" is belied by 
the record. (Appellant's Brief, pp.13, 15.) The prosecutor changed her question 
from what was an open-ended question regarding Officer Shephard's opinions to 
a precise question directed at his opinion on whether the pipe was used for 
methamphetamine. (Trial Tr., compare p.198, L.5 with p.198, Ls.13-17.) The 
second question was different than the one to which defense counsel objected 
and was entirely appropriate. Further, because Gray did not object to the 
second question, she must show the question constituted fundamental error; she 
has failed to meet this burden3 because the prosecutor's question was not 
improper, did not violate any of Gray's constitutional rights, and was not clear 
error. Even if this Court disagrees, any error was harmless for the reasons 
previously stated in relation to Gray's prior misconduct claim. 
3 Gray again tries to use a previous objection that was made and apply it to 
subsequent questions. (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) For the reasons stated in 
footnote 1, such an attempt should be rejected. 
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11. 
Gray's Cumulative Error Claim Fails Because There Was No Error, Much Less 
More Than One Preserved Error To Cumulate 
Gray contends that, even if this Court finds any of her claimed errors 
harmless, "she is entitled to a new trial nonetheless." (Appellant's Brief, p.17.) 
This argument is without merit. 
"Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in and 
of themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. However, a 
necessary predicate to the application of the doctrine is a finding of more than 
one error." State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 334 P.3d 806, 823 (2014) (quoting 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 230, 245 P.3d at 982). Fatal to Gray's cumulative error claim 
is that of the three errors she claims on appeal, only one was preserved by an 
objection. "[l]t is well-established that alleged errors at trial, that are not followed 
by a contemporaneous objection, will not be considered under the cumulative 
error doctrine unless said errors are found to pass the threshold analysis under 
the fundamental error doctrine." kl Because Gray's unpreserved errors do not 
"pass the threshold analysis under the fundamental error doctrine," the single 
error Gray preserved cannot cumulate with any other error. Even if Gray's 
unpreserved claims could pass the threshold analysis, given the weight of the 
evidence presented that Gray was guilty of all three charged offenses, "[t]he 
errors here in the aggregate do not show the absence of a fair trial." Parker, 157 
Idaho at , 334 P.3d at 823. 
Gray has failed to show any basis for a new trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and 
sentences entered upon the jury verdicts finding Gray guilty of driving under the 
influence, possession of paraphernalia, and felony possession of a controlled 
substance 
DATED this 13th day of February 2015. 
111 n n J !!~4--
JE:$SICA M. LORELLO 
d,eputy Attorney General 
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